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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate corporate governance disclosure practices of 
Islamic banking in Indonesia. We content analyse the annual reports of Islamic banks in Indonesia 
in 2010 to 2013. This study used a disclosure index developed by Darmadi (2011) to calculate the 
extent of corporate governance disclosure. The composite index construction uses 7 dimension of 
corporate governance mechanism including shariah governance namely shariah supervisory board, 
board of commissionair, board  director, board committee, internal control and external audit, risk 
management, corporate governance implementaion reporting.  
The results conclude that the 11islamic banks in 3 years adhere to 71% of attributes of the 
corporate governance disclosure index.  
 
Keywords: corporate governance disclosure, Islamic banking 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
After a series of corporate scandals occured in 
the early 2000s, attention to corporate 
governance  increased sinificantly.  Questions 
was raised about the strength of governance 
in corporations especially in financial sector. 
Weak governance in those financial 
institutions have contributed to financal 
scandals and financial crisis (Srairi, 2015) 
To gain the trust of stakeholders, companies 
are constantly required to increase 
transparency in their management. One of the 
efforts of the companies is to reveal their 
corporate governance practice. As Bhat, Hope 
and Kang (2006) mentioned, knowledge 
about the governance structure of the 
company is useful to assess the credibility of 
financial information. This is due to 
governance related disclosures to help users 
of financial information in assessing the 
quality of information and guide the 
stakeholders establish performance 
expectations in the future. 
Related to corporate governance, Islamic 
banking has its own uniqueness in terms of 
agency relationships that exist therein 
(Safieddin, 2009). The first problem is the 
necessity to comply with the sharia. The 
second problem is related to Islamic banking 
operations where Islamic banking has the 
authority to determine policy  on payment of 
returns to depositors that depends on bank 
profitability. From here arises the potential 
for manipulation of the yield to the 
depositors.   
Mudaraba investment accounts that exist in 
Islamic banking Islamic banking add to the 
risk profile compared to conventional 
banking. Strong corporate governance is 
expected to address the problem of investor 
confidence in respect of this risk (Abdullah, 
Percy and Stewart, 2014).  
However, corporate governance on Islamic 
banking was also not immune to the problems 
faced by conventional banks. Failure 
corporate governance on Islamic banking 
even has features similar to the conventional 
banking for example collusion between 
commissioners with management, failure of 
internal and external audits, a disregard for 
the interests of minority shareholders, 
unprudent lending decisions, excessive risk 
taking by management (Grais and Pelegrini , 
2006b). Grais and Pellegrini (2006b) using a 
sample of 13 Islamic financial institutions of 
various countries have also found problems in 
the internal arrangement specific to Islamic 
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financial institutions. Internal corporate 
governance arrangement presents challenges 
in Islamic banking product in question is a 
collection of funds (funding) in the form of 
Unrestricted Investments Account / UIA 
(Magalhaes and Al Saad, 2011). In the UIA, 
the owner of the funds as well as shareholders 
who entrust their funds to investors. 
There are several studies on corporate 
governance inIslamic financial institutions. 
However, in general those studies were 
carried out in the context of the countries of 
Southeast Asia and the Middle East, for 
example, Abdullah, Percy, Stewart (2014); 
Sulaiman Majid, Arifin (2013); Majid, 
Sulaiman, Ariffin (2011); Abdullah, (2013); 
Mizushima, (2014). 
Darmadi (2011) to the best of authors' 
knowledge is the first to investigate the 
disclosure of corporate governance on Islamic 
banking in Indonesia according to the Bank 
Indonesia rules on corporate governance for 
Islamic Banking year 2009.  Study conducted 
by Darmadi (2011) concluded that for some 
disclosure dimensions he found a strong 
example of the board members and risk 
management. However for another 
dimensions such as internal control and board 
committee he found weak disclosure.  
This sudy investigate corporate governance 
disclosure practices of Islamic banking in 
Indonesia. We content analyse the annual 
reports of Islamic banks in Indonesia in 2010 
to 2013. This study used a disclosure index 
developed by Darmadi (2011) to calculate the 
extent of corporate governance 
disclosure.This research is important to do for 
several reasons. The first, this research will 
reveal how far Islamic banking in Indonesia 
CG disclosure activity, particularly related to 
CG issues specific to the Islamic banking. 
Secondly, this study focuses on Indonesia, 
which has differet characteristics of corporate 
governance.  Indonesia is adopting two-tier 
board system where companies must have a 
dual board structure governance, the board of 
commisioners  as well as the management 
board (board of directors). 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Corporate Governance 
The Indonesian Forum for Corporate 
Governance (FCGI) in its explanation of the 
meaning of the corporate governance used the 
definition developed by the Cadbury 
Committee: "a set of rules that govern the 
relationship between shareholders, managers 
of the company, the creditors, governments, 
employees and stakeholders internal and 
external to other related rights and their 
obligations, or in other words a system to 
regulate and control the company." 
The goal of corporate governance according 
to FCGI is "to create added value for all 
stakeholders." Corporate governance term is 
often used to describe the role and behavior of 
the parties in the management structure, the 
shareholders, the Board of Directors, Board of 
Commissioners. 
Historically, there are two generations in the 
development of the conception of corporate 
governance (Syakhroza, 2005). The first 
generation was developed by Berle and 
Means (1932) (in Syakhroza, 2005) which 
describes the separation between those who 
manage the company party company that 
raises the need for a mechanism to ensure that 
the management company to perform its 
functions in accordance with the interests of 
the owners. The second generation is marked 
by the work LLSV (La Porta, Lopez de 
Silanes, Shleiver da Vishny) in 1988 (Dennis 
and McConnell, 2003 in Syakhroza, 2005). 
LLSV found the tendency of concentration of 
ownership on certain parties. 
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Islamic Banking 
Historically, Muslims do not know the 
vocabulary word "bank" in Islamic 
jurisprudence. However, the functions of 
modern banking has been practiced Muslims 
even since the time of Prophet Muhammad 
SAW (Karim, 2006). 
Development of Islamic banking is under the 
"umbrella" of Islamic finance (Islamic 
finance). In Islamic finance, there are three 
main principles that can not be ignored, 
namely the prohibition of usury, banning of 
gharar transaction and provision of social 
services. 
As explained by Karim (2006), basically there 
are three major parts of Islamic banking 
products, namely funding, financing and 
services. For funding, the principles of 
wadi'ah and revenue sharing /mudaraba is 
applied. There are two kinds of mudaraba 
contract: mudaraba mutlaqah (Unrestricted 
Investment Account) and Mudharaba 
muqayyadah (Restricted Investment 
Accounts). For financing the principles of 
purchase / bai ', lease (Ijara), revenue 
(syirkah) as well as other complementary 
contract are applied. In Islamic banking 
services the principle of Sharf (sale and 
purchase of foreign exchange) and Ijara 
(lease) are applied. 
Indonesia currently has a dual banking system 
which together run the conventional banking 
and Islamic banking. Development of Islamic 
banking in Indonesia already has a legal basis 
to the Law No. 21, 2008. The legal basis is 
expected to accelerate the development of 
Islamic banking. 
 
Corporate Governance in Islamic Banking 
CG in banking has its own uniqueness 
compared to other sectors. CG mechanism is 
not only intended to align the interests of 
management and shareholders to protect the 
interests of minority owners of the majority 
owner alone. In banking, the manager served 
to protect the funds entrusted by the various 
parties in the bank, including by depositors. 
Banking has a high level of risk because of 
high levels of leverage in its capital structure. 
Banks also have a wider range of 
stakeholders, as well as play an important role 
in the economy. Systemic risk in the banking 
shown by the problems in one bank can 
spread to other banks. This can bring about 
economic instability and also complicate the 
problems of the banking agency (Grand, 
2011; Safieddin, 2009). 
Meanwhile CG on Islamic banking requires 
special attention for several reasons. The first 
is the obligation for banks to comply with the 
rules of Islamic sharia. Islamic rules governed 
by the Sharia Supervisory Board prohibits 
transactions that are usurious, gharar 
(speculative) trading. Islamic banking, which 
serves as the investment manager must ensure 
that the funds deposited in Islamic banking is 
not invested in instruments that contain 
elements against sharia as mentioned above. 
Any deviation from this obedience led to a 
new source of agency problem. The second is 
that Islamic banking has the depositors which 
is Unrestricted Investment Account Holder. 
The total of Unrestricted Investment 
Accounts are generally higher than 
shareholders' equity but do not have voting 
rights in the company. The third is Islamic 
banking in emerging markets generally are 
where institutionally weaker than developed 
markets (Safieddin, 2009; Darmadi, 2011; 
Grais and Pellegrini, 2006a). 
 
Disclosure CG on Islamic Banking 
With regards to their unique role in the 
economy, banks have extensive stakeholder 
including employees, customers, depositors, 
suppliers, regulators, and government (Basel 
Committee, 2006). In the context of 
relationship between bank and its 
stakeholders, Hossain (2007) in Wan 
Abdullah (2013) states that there are 
problems, especially related to information 
asymmetry in asset quality and risk. Banks 
also have complicated operations resulting in 
a tendency to be transparent in its disclosure 
activities compared to practices in other 
industries or even other financial institutions 
(Wan Abdullah, 2013). 
Principles of CG which is adopted by many 
countries is the OECD's principles of Good 
Corporate Governance. In banking, the most 
widely accepted standard regulation is issued 
by Bassel Comittee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), the global standard setter for 
banking regulation, which published 
"Principles for Enhancing Corporate 
Governance" in 2006 and then revised in 
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2010. For Islamic banking, AAOIFI ( 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic financial institutions) issued a 
governance standards which are applicable to 
Islamic financial institutions. On the other 
hand,  The International Financial Services 
Board (IFSB) also issued a CG principles 
which adopted OECD corporate governance 
principles and internationally accepted BCBS 
as well as incorporate the characteristics of 
Islamic banking in it. 
In Indonesia, the National Committee on 
Governance (NCG) issued the Code of the 
Bank Indonesia issued a regulation to support 
the CG framework for conventional and 
Islamic banking. This authority then switch 
from Bank Indonesia to the Financial Services 
Authority. It is important to note that 
Indonesian business environment is 
characterized by a high concentration of 
ownership, ownership and shareholder 
family-run. In turn, this situtation is potential 
to make the gap between the existing rules 
and reality (Wan Abdullah, 2013; http://knkg-
indonesia.com/home/ accessed at 20 April 
2015; www.ojk.go.id accessed on 20 April 
2015). 
Specifically, the rules relating to Islamic 
banking CG stated in BI regulation No. 11/33 
/ PBI / 2009. Further provisions on this 
subject in the Circular No. 12/13 / DPbS 
governing the implementation of Good 
Corporate Governance for Islamic Banks and 
Sharia Business Unit in Indonesia. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The population of this study is Islamic 
Banking in Indonesia. We chose Islamic 
Banks’ annual report from year 2010-2013 
since the BI regulation No 11/33/PBI/2009 
was effective since 2010.   
We content analyse the annual reports of 
Islamic Banks to measure the extent of level 
of disclosure of those companies. CG 
disclosure is measured using the level of 
disclosure used an index developed Darmadi 
(2011). Index CG obtained from the total 
disclosure made bank divided by the total 
disclosure CG possible. 
The list below show seven dimension of corporate governance reporting for Islamic Banks. 
A. Dimension: Shariah Supervisory Board  
1. Names of members  
2. Positions of members  
3. Pictures of members  
4. Profiles of members  
5. Number of meetings held  
6. Members’ attendance in meetings  
7. Remuneration of members  
8. Duties and responsibilities of the board  
9. Compliance of products and services with 
shariah  
10. Compliance of profit or loss with shariah  
11. Examination procedures  
12. Recommendation to management  
B. Dimension: Board of Commissioners  
1. Names of members  
3. Existence of a risk-monitoring committee  
4. Existence of a corporate governance 
committee  
5. Duties and responsibilities of each committee  
6. Committee reports in the annual report  
7. Names of members  
8. Positions of members  
9. Pictures of members  
10. Profiles of members  
11. Most members being independent  
12. Number of meetings held  
13. Members’ attendance in meetings  
14. Remuneration of members  
15. Performance of each committee  
E. Dimension: Internal control and external 
audit  
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2. Positions of members  
3. Pictures of members  
4. Profiles of members  
5. Independence of members  
6. At least 50% of members being independent  
7. Multiple commissionership/directorship held 
by members  
8. Number of meetings held  
9. Members’ attendance in meetings  
10. Remuneration of members  
11. Duties and responsibilities of the board  
12. Shareholdings of members  
13. Recommendation to management  
C. Dimension: Board of Directors  
1. Names of members  
2. Positions of members  
3. Pictures of members  
4. Profiles of members  
5. Number of meetings held  
6. Members’ attendance in meetings  
7. Remuneration of members  
8. Duties and responsibilities of the board  
9. Shareholdings of members  
D. Dimension: Board committees  
1. Existence of an audit committee  
2. Existence of a remuneration and nomination 
committee  
 
1. Internal control report in the annual report  
2. Existence of an internal audit division  
3. Internal audit framework  
4. Duties and responsibilities of internal audit 
division  
5. Internal audit certification held by employees  
6. Policies on the appointment of external auditor  
7. External auditor appointed by the bank  
8. Performance of internal audit division  
F. Dimension: Risk management  
1. Risk management report in the annual report  
2. Existence of a risk management division  
3. Risk management framework  
4. Duties and responsibilities of risk management 
division  
5. Risk management certification held by 
employees  
6. Market risk management  
7. Credit risk management  
8. Liquidity risk management  
9. Operational risk management  
10. Risk profile  
G. Dimension: Corporate governance 
implementation reporting  
1. Corporate governance implementation report 
in the annual report  
2. GCG framework  
3. Code of conduct  
4. GCG self-assessment  
5. GCG assessment by an external party  
Sumber: Darmadi (2011) 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
In this study, there are 11 Islamic banks as research objects. To eleven banks are as follows: 
 
No.  Bank  
1  PT. Bank BCA Syariah  
2  PT. Bank BNI Syariah  
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3  PT. Bank BRI Syariah  
4  PT. Bank Jabar Banten Syariah  
5  PT. Maybank Syariah  
6  PT. Muamalat Syariah  
7  PT. Panin Syariah  
8  PT . Bukopin Syariah  
9  PT. Syariah Mandiri  
10  PT. Syariah Mega Indonesia  
11  PT. Victoria Syariah  
 
A. Dimension: Shariah Supervisory 
Board 
This dimension reflects the unique 
characteristics of Islamic Financial 
Institution which have to comply 
with shariah. In this dimension 
companies should disclose the 
details of the members of the board 
as well as how the board perform 
their job.  There are 12 checklist in 
this dimension.  
Index for this dimension show 63% 
adherence to the disclosure 
checklist.    
Exerpts of disclosure on shariah 
supervisory board are as follows: 
Referring to Bank Indonesia Regulation 
(PBI) No. 11/33/PBI/2009 on the 
Implementation of Good Corporate 
Governance for Sharia Commercial 
Banks and Sharia Business Units, PBI 
No. 11/3/ PBI/2009, on Sharia 
Commercial Banks, and the Circular 
(SE) BI No.8/19/DPbS/2006, on the 
Sharia Supervisory Guidelines and 
Procedures for Reporting and 
Monitoring Results for Sharia 
Supervisory Board, and after conducting 
supervision and observation of: 
1. Operational and product 
guidelines issued by PT Bank 
BRISyariah; 
2. The operations of PT Bank 
BRISyariah; 
3. Financial Statements of PT Bank 
BRISyariah for the year ended 31 
December 2014 
The Sharia Supervisory Board herewith 
submits 
the following opinions: 
1. Guidelines for the operations 
and products covering the 
mobilization and distribution of 
funds of PT Bank BRISyariah 
have conformed to the Advices of 
the National Sharia Council – 
Indonesian Council of Ulama 
(DSN-MUI) as well as the 
opinions of Sharia Supervisory 
Board of PT Bank BRI Syariah. 
2. The operation of PT Bank 
BRISyariah has complied with 
the Advices of the National 
Sharia Council – Indonesian 
Council of Ulama (DSN-MUI) as 
well as opinions of the Sharia 
Supervisory Board of PT Bank 
BRISyariah, 
3. Financial Statements of PT Bank 
BRISyariah ended 31 December 
2014 has been prepared and 
presented according to the 
Sharia Principles. 
4. The opinion is submitted, 
assuming that the documents 
presented to the Sharia 
Supervisory Board are correctt 
and complete 
5. The opinion may change in case 
of discrepancies or data 
submitted in the documents are 
proven incorrect or there is a 
material information not 
submitted 
6. The accountability to the 
opinion is limited to the copy of 
documents submitted to the 
Sharia Supervisory Board 
In witness thereof, this opinion is 
submitted, hoping that Allah SWT would 
always guide us to walk through the 
right corridor and give us strength to 
carry out Islamic principles with all His 
righteousness, Amin. 
 
B. Dimension: Board of 
Commissioners 
In this dimension, companies should 
disclose background, performance 
including remuneration of the 
member of the Board. The adherence 
level to the disclosure checklist rose 
to 87% in this dimension. This 
explains that most companies are 
transparent about their Board of 
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Commissioner. Exerpts of disclosure 
on board of commisioners are as 
follows: 
Independence of the Board of Commissioners 
i. Concurrent Positions  
In order to apply the principles 
of Transparency and 
Independency in the 
implementation of good 
corporate governance, the 
members of the Board of 
Commissioners have revealed 
the concurrent positions, as 
described the following table. 
The concurrent positions of the 
members of the Board of 
Commissioners are not 
contrary to the statutory of the 
applicable provisions. There 
are no independent members of 
the Board of Commissioners 
who have concurrent positions 
at the financial institutions 
and/ or companies that are 
customers of the Bank. Other 
concorrent positions were only 
possessed by the 
Commissioner whobecomes the 
representative of the 
controlling shareholder. This 
makes the BOC more 
independent and able to avoid 
conflicts of interest. 
 
 
C. Dimension: Board of Directors  
This dimension’s checklist are almost 
the same with Board of 
Commissioner, it should contains 
explanation regarding background, 
performance including remuneration 
of the member of the Board. 81% of 
compliance to the checklist is found 
from the disclosure. Exerpts of 
disclosure on board of directors are as 
follows: 
In the application of their duties and 
responsibilities, as well as in deciding 
strategic issues, the Board of Directors 
during the period of 2014 has conducted 
44 meetings which were performed by 
quorum (meeting the requirement of 
minimum number of participants) and 
decisions were taken by consensus 
without setting aside the dynamics that 
occur during the meetings.. 
 
D. Dimension: Board committees 
The fourth dimension, Board 
Committees extend the discussion 
about committees inside the Board 
structure. These committees are in 
place to help the board with their 
expertise such us accounting, islamic 
banking, HRM expertise. The 
committees include audit committee, 
remuneration committee etc. The 
percentage of adherence of the banks 
tin this dimension reach 73%. Exerpts 
of disclosure on board committees are 
as follows: 
The Audit Committee has generally been 
carrying out their duties according to the 
applicable regulations, namely to assist 
the Board of Commissioners in 
performing oversight functions, which 
include: 
i.    Monitor and evaluate the 
planning and execution of audit 
and monitor the follow-up of the 
results of the audit in order to 
assess the adequacy of internal 
control, including the adequacy 
of the financial reporting 
process; 
ii. To evaluate the: 
a. Implementation of the duties 
of the Internal Audit Unit 
(SKAI); 
b. Compliance of the audit 
performed by the KAP 
(Public Accounting Firm) 
with the applicable auditing 
standards; 
c. Financial Statements 
Compliance to the applicable 
accounting standards; 
and..... 
 
E. Dimension: Internal control and 
external audit 
In this corporate governance 
dimension, banks should disclose 
their internal control, internal audit 
and external audit environment. 
Indonesian Islamic Banks adhere to at 
at only 51%. Not much can be drawn 
by financial report reader with 
regards to those bank’s disclosure in 
this dimension. Exerpts of disclosure 
on internal control and external audit 
are as follows:   
The implementation of the External Audit 
Function of on the Financial Statements 
for the financial year 2014 has complied 
with Bank Indonesia regulation related 
to the transparency of financial 
condition of the Bank, and the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Standards, as well 
as the employment agreement and scope 
of the audit that has been set. Taking into 
account the recommendations from the 
Audit Committee, the appointment of the 
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same public accounting firm shall be 
conducted at a maximum of only five (5) 
consecutive fiscal years and the same 
accountant of the Public Accounting 
Firm (KAP) is allowed to perform audit 
for four (4) consecutive fiscal years. To 
meet professional standards, the Bank 
has appointed a Public Accounting Firm 
which is registered in Bank Indonesia 
and included as the 5 best KAP, namely 
Purwantono, Suherman, Surja, member 
of the Ernst & Young Global. This Public 
Accounting Firm has audited BRIS for 4 
years in a row. Thus the implementation 
of the external audit function complies 
with the provisions of the relevant 
regulations. 
 
F. Dimension: Risk management 
Risk management is one of the most 
critical part of financial institution’s 
management. In this dimension, 
banks are hoped to disclose 
information regarding existance, 
framework, certification, report on 
risk management; include report on 
specific areas of risk management 
and risk profile. The banks adhere to 
64% of the disclosure checklist. 
Exerpts of disclosure on risk 
management are as follows: 
BRISyariah has applied the three line of 
defense principle to identify, measure, 
monitor, and to ensure the availability of 
adequate reports in managing risks 
comprehensively and consistently. The 
Business Units and The Support Units 
serve as the first line of defense and are 
having primary responsibility for the day 
to day management of the risk exposures 
of the business. They are accountable for 
identifying, assessing, controlling and 
mitigating the risks in business. 
G. Dimension: Corporate governance 
implementation reporting  
Companies should disclose the 
implementation of corporate 
governance in their corporate 
structure. This include structure, 
mechanism and the practice of 
corporate governance. 46% of the 
corporate governance implementation 
reporting checklist has been disclosed 
by Indonesian Islamic Banks. Exerpts 
of disclosure on corporate governance 
implementation reporting are as 
follows:  
Bank BRISyariah (BRIS) has made the 
implementation of Good Corporate 
Governance(GCG) as one of the 
Company’s foundations to achieve its 
vision and mission, as well as for 
sustainable growth in the future. 
First: Transparency, namely the 
openness in expressing material and 
relevant information and openness in the 
decision-making process. The 
application of this principle requires the 
Bank to provide adequate, accurate, 
timely information to all of its 
stakeholders. 
Second: Accountability, namely the 
clarity of functions and implementation, 
as well as the accountability of the 
Bank’s organs thus its management 
becomes effective. Effective application 
of this will lead to the clarity of 
functions, rights, obligations and 
authorities and responsibilities between 
the shareholders, the Board of 
Commissioners and the Board of 
Directors and the ranks below. 
Third: Responsibility, namely the 
conformity of the Bank’s management 
with the legislations in force and the 
principles of sound bank management, 
among others; tax issues, industrial 
relations, work health and safety, 
environmental protection, maintaining a 
conducive business environment with the 
community and so on. Thus, the Bank 
realizes that in its operations, the Bank is 
responsible not only to the shareholders 
but also to other stakeholders.  
Fourth: Professional, namely possessing 
competence, able to act objectively, and 
free from the influence/ pressure from all 
parties(independent) and possess a 
strong commitment to develop the 
Islamic bank. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It can be concluded that the level of 
disclosure of corporate governance has an 
average index of 66% so that it can be said 
that the disclosure level is quite low. 
However, some corporate governance 
dimension shown high level of disclosure 
namely Board of Commissioners and Board 
of Directors.  
Islamic Banks should put more effort to 
disclose information with regard to the 
practice of corporate governance inside their 
companies. This is important to gain more 
level of credibility from stakeholder.  
We call for further research to deeply 
investigate more about corporate governance 
disclosure in islamic banks, and find its 
relationship with factors contribute to it; its 
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effect on performance and the relevance of 
corporate governance information.  
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